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An important question for manufacturers is the extent to which
control over the suppliers should be maintained when the interaction
occurs in an uncertain environment. It is proposed in this paper that
the level of trust(high and low) affect the manufacturer’s level of
monitoring and perceived supplier performance in uncertain
environments. The empirical results from US manufacturers indicate
the following: 1) When the trustworthiness of exchange partners is
questionable, manufacturers tend to increase the level of monitoring
over the supplier as they feel environmental uncertainty. On the other
hand, those who place a high level of trust in a partner may need to rely
on monitoring to a lesser extent regardless of environmental
uncertainty. 2) Supplier performance, as perceived by manufacturers, is
negatively associated with environmental uncertainty when a
manufacturer’s trust in its supplier is low, but it has no relationship
with environmental uncertainty when there is high trust. 
Keywords: trust, monitoring, performance, environmental uncertainty
INTRODUCTION
Manufacturers face many sources of environmental
uncertainty in the relationship with their suppliers (Scott 1992).
They experience uncertainty when the relevant contingencies are
too numerous or unpredictable to be specified (Stump and Heide
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1996). For example, a volatile supply of component parts creates
uncertainty for a manufacturer that requires a steady
procurement of parts from its supplier. The manufacturer would
therefore need to consider applying a certain level of interfirm
control over the supplier to deal with uncertain supply(Celly and
Frazier 1996). Interfirm control is based on monitoring the
output of a partner and eventually encouraging the desired
performance level.(Bello and Gilliland 1997; Stump and Heide
1996; Celly and Frazier 1996; Heide 1994).
The question that must be answered is: what level of control
over the supplier should be maintained in uncertain
environments? A few studies provide ample evidence that
environmental uncertainty is positively associated with interfirm
control(Celly and Frazier 1996; Sachdev, Bello, and Pilling 1994;
Klein, Frazier, and Roth 1990). However, some researchers
suggest that social context in which exchange parties are deeply
embedded should play a part in the consideration of relevant
control levels(e.g., Hagen & Choe 1998; Hill 1990; Shapiro 1987;
Granovetter 1985). Since exchange parties as a social entity
interact with their channel partners, they are more likely to
develop a social relationship represented by relational norms or
trust(Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987). These social factors are a
major influencing factor over the inter-organizational
relationship and its performance(e.g., Doney and Cannon 1997;
Ganesan 1994; Noordewier et al. 1990). Existing literature offers
a limited explanation on the influence of the social context on a
firm’s choice of interfirm control, as well as on the efficiency of
economic performance in uncertain environments. Transaction
cost analysis(TCA), for instance does not explain why two firms
with the same perception of the level of uncertainty within
environments exercise different levels of interfirm control over
their exchange partners(Chiles & McMackin 1996).
This study proposes that the inclusion of trust which is a
social context variable, may explain different levels of monitoring
over the exchange partner in uncertain environments. Interfirm
trust has emerged as a central focus of literature on channels of
distribution and business-to-business relationships(e.g., Wilson
1995; Morgan and Hunt 1994; Andaleeb 1992). Researchers
have found that the benefits of placing trust in a supplier include
the reduction of negotiation costs(Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone
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1998), an increase in the firm’s willingness to candidly discuss
needs(Zaltman and Moorman 1988), the enhancement of
proprietary information exchange(Zand 1972) as well as
cooperation(Schurr and Ozanne 1985), the facilitation of a long-
term orientation (Doney and Cannon 1997; Geyskens et al 1996:
Ganesan 1994), and finally, increased performance(Jap 1999).
Thus, considering the effect of trust on transaction costs and
performance, trust might be a crucial factor for interfirm
monitoring and performance under uncertain environments.
This study seeks to examine the condition under which
manufacturers that face various levels of uncertain environments
adopt appropriate levels of monitoring over their suppliers and
maintain various level of supplier performance. One major goal of
this research is to investigate the extent to which a
manufacturer’s trust in its supplier affects its response(the level
of monitoring over the supplier) to environmental uncertainty.
Although trust is considered to be an important relational
variable(Doney and Cannon 1997; Ganesan 1994), its influence
on interfirm monitoring within uncertain environments has not
been investigated enough. A second goal is to investigate the
impact of a manufacturer’s trust on perceived supplier
performance in diverse levels of environmental uncertainty.
Although the effect of trust on interfirm performance has been
studied(e.g., Jap 1999; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone 1998),
studies on the influence of trust on the relationship between
uncertain environments and the manufacturer’s buying
performance are rare. The theoretical framework and research
hypotheses are provided in the following section. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUNDS AND HYPOTHESES
Trust 
Trust is defined as a willingness to rely on an exchange partner
whose behavior is not under one’s control(Mayer, Davis, and
Shoorman 1995; Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpande 1992;
Swan, Trawick and Silva 1985; Zand 1972). The voluntary
dependence of a manufacturer on its supplier is based on
optimistic expectations about outcomes(Hosmer 1995). Thus,
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there is a possibility that the manufacturer will be worse off if its
trust is betrayed. Trust is therefore a manufacturer’s belief that
the supplier will not only execute actions that will result in
positive outcomes but also avoid actions that would result in
negative outcomes(Anderson and Narus 1990).
Trust embodies the feature of trustor’s vulnerability due to the
absence of direct control over the trustee(Coleman 1990). For
instance, a manufacturer that expects the delivery of parts on
time from its supplier might encounter problems in the case
where the supplier fails to deliver the parts on time. Thus, the
manufacturer that places trusts in its supplier for on-time
delivery would be vulnerable. If the manufacturer can easily
obtain the parts in a timely fashion from an alternative supplier,
it would not need to rely on the incumbent supplier for delivery.
In this instance, the parts would be delivered on time regardless
of whether the manufacturer trusts the supplier or not. Thus,
the direct result of trusting a supplier would be inconsequential
to the manufacturer and the issue of vulnerability would be
eliminated also. Trust therefore exists only when a
manufacturer’s expected outcome, such as the acquisition of
parts on time at a reasonable price, is considered as
fundamental(Das and Teng 1998). 
The question as to where the vulnerability of manufacturer
originates from must also be answered. When a manufacturer
faces uncertainty within the environment as in the case of
unstable supply of components or volatility in their prices,
perfect information is difficult to come by. The manufacturer is
therefore considered to be vulnerable as a result of lack of
relevant information on the availability or price of component
parts. If the manufacturer experiences no uncertainty regarding
the purchase of parts, trust might not be necessary, as there
would be complete information available.(Moorman et al. 1993).
Environmental uncertainty therefore generates a condition in
which inter-organizational trust can operate. 
According to transaction cots theory(TCA), inter-organizational
exchanges within uncertain environments are associated with
transaction costs such as the monitoring of the supplier to
prevent the inflation of prices, the taking of actions when
deliveries are not made on time, and the collecting information
on part prices in the market(Noordewier et al. 1990; Maitland et
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al. 1985). Since these transactions costs are high, market
exchange is not relevant to dealing with an uncertain
environment. Thus, TCA suggests interfirm control mechanisms
such as monitoring of the partner. However, interfirm control
requires transaction costs such expenditures associated with the
monitoring of outputs and behavior of the exchange partner.
Trust placed in an exchange partner reduces transaction costs
(Chiles & McMackin 1996) as the supplier’s record of credible
performance gives the manufacturer a certain confidence that
makes monitoring unnecessary(Barber 1983). Furthermore, the
manufacturer’s trust in the supplier’s performance contributes to
the reduction in enforcing costs, an expenditure for correcting
poor performance(Chiles & McMackin 1996). A supplier’s
reputation for trustworthy behavior decreases negotiating costs
as both parties are accommodating and quick to come to a
resolution rather than adopt competitive stance in which parties
are cautious and slow to come to a resolution(March 1988).
Finally, trust reduces costs associated with the drafting of a
contract, since contractual terms are more loosely specified
rather than detailed when trust exists(Chiles & McMackin 1996).
Trust generates an expectation that contingencies that are not
addressed in the contract will be sufficiently dealt with by the
benevolent partner. In the absence of trust, a prudent
manufacturer should make detailed and specified terms to
ensure that it is better prepared for every possible situation that
could arise as a result of the possibility that its supplier would
take advantage of obscure terms. A manufacturer’s trust in its
supplier therefore reduces transaction costs.
Low transaction costs involved with trust imply that trust
could be an attractive mechanism for reducing interfirm control
over the exchange partner in an uncertain environment. Several
researchers imply trust could complement interfirm control(e.g.,
Moorman et al. 1992; Ouchi 1979). Moorman et al.(1992)
propose that trust reduces perceived uncertainty. Since an
exchange party tends to increase control to deal with
environmental uncertainty, the reduced uncertainty could lead to
the decrease in interfirm control. Ouchi(1979) argued that an
exchange party must trust its partner, or it should closely
monitor the partner. Although trust is not directly mentioned,
John(1984) points out that it is insufficient to rely only on
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interfirm control, so internalized social restraints must be
cultivated to complement interfirm control. 
Environmental Uncertainty, Monitoring, and Trust 
Exchange parties face environmental uncertainty that stems
from various sources(e.g., upstream or downstream) in decision-
making situations(Scott 1992). The environmental uncertainty
experienced by the buyer can be described as upstream as it
includes attributes such as the supplier’s unstable supply of
component parts or the volatile nature of price changes of
component parts. Therefore, the discussion will be centered
mainly on the buyer’s upstream environmental uncertainty.
An organization experiences uncertainty when it does not have
relevant information(Argote 1982). Environmental uncertainty
makes it difficult for exchange parties to make accurate
predictions about future business conditions(Frazier and Antia
1995; Jaworski 1988; Achrol and Stern 1988). Unexpected fuel
supply interruptions, raw material shortages and the like may
prevent a supplier from fulfilling orders for manufacturing
inputs. Exchange parties are forced to adopt an interfirm control
structure best suited to conditions of high uncertainty in
industries within which such uncertainty exists(Stump and
Heide 1996). 
Interfirm control is based on monitoring the performance of the
other party, that is, measuring output performance(e.g., Heide
1994; Celly and Frazier 1996). Monitoring may involve either the
review of the supplier’s performance or the imposition of a formal
evaluation program on vendor performance(e.g., Heide 1994;
Celly and Frazier 1996). Monitoring therefore reduces
information asymmetry between exchanges parties by revealing
the degree to which the supplier has complied with terms
previously agreed upon(Balakrishnan and Koza 1993; Lal 1990).
By monitoring suppliers unilaterally, a manufacturer therefore
can obtain the overt control necessary to accomplish its own
ends(Rubin 1990). It therefore provides a good proxy for interfirm
control. 
The exchange party is likely to take advantage of the uncertain
situation for its own interest(Klein, Frazier, and Roth 1990).
Therefore, while exchange parties in stable environments are less
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likely to engage in opportunistic behavior: self interest-seeking
behavior with guile(Williamson 1975). For instance, when a
manufacturer is not sure it can acquire the necessary amount of
components due to an uncertain supply of parts in the market,
its supplier may sell the parts to other buyers who could offer
high prices for the parts while deceiving the current
manufacturer that the parts are still in short supply. When a
manufacturer’s trust in its supplier is low, the manufacturer
either places no credibility in its supplier’s performance or
benevolent intention. A manufacturer with a low level of trust in
its supplier therefore should increase the level of monitoring over
its supplier to prevent such opportunistic behavior, as
environmental uncertainty increases.
When a manufacturer does not trust its supplier, it is less
likely to reveal relevant information to the supplier or is on the
other hand, more likely to distort information(Dirks & Ferrin
2001; Hedlund and Nonaka 1993). The supplier may respond in
kind for the lack of information by not providing relevant
information to the manufacturer. The manufacturer therefore
may be suspicious of the information provided by its supplier.
Thus, a manufacturer that does not place trust in its supplier is
not equipped with relevant information to handle uncertain
environments. The need for information is higher in highly
uncertain environments than those in which low uncertainty
prevails, since the relevant contingencies are too numerous to be
specified or are unpredictable in nature(Stump and Heide 1996).
Thus, the low level of trust that a manufacturer places in its
supplier encourages the manufacturer to increase the level of
monitoring over the supplier to reduce information asymmetry as
environmental uncertainty increases. Since monitoring involves
the manufacturer’s supervision of the supplier’s performance in
relation to variables such as on-time delivery, price of delivered
parts, or the supplier’s inventory level, the manufacturer that
operates within an uncertain environment can eliminate
vulnerability supplier’s betrayal. Thus, the first hypothesis is: 
H1: When a manufacturer’s trust in its supplier is low, as the
manufacturer’s perception of environmental uncertainty
increases, the manufacturer’s monitoring over the supplier
increases.
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The presence of trust in inter-organizational relationship leads
to more accurate and timely information exchange(Lewis and
Weight 1985; Zand 1972). Such information exchange affords a
manufacturer a better understanding of the component parts,
the supplier, and the component markets. The manufacturer
equipped with information is less likely to allow its supplier to
cheat on it. Furthermore, trust enables both parties to find
productive solutions to disagreements that might occur
(Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpande 1992) and to adopt
cooperative problem-solving approach(Schurr and Ozanne 1985).
This suggests that the hazard of opportunistic behavior in
uncertain environments can be mitigated substantially if trust
exists. 
While there is little chance for the supplier to cheat within low
environmental uncertainty, there is a condition in which the
supplier takes advantage of the uncertain situation for its own
interest in high environmental uncertainty(Klein, Frazier, and
Roth 1990). The manufacturer in highly uncertain environments
should therefore prepare for the supplier’s opportunistic
behavior. However, a manufacturer’s trusts its supplier allows
the manufacturer not to worry about being ripped off by its
supplier that could take advantage of environmental uncertainty.
The manufacturer believes that the trustworthy supplier won’t
inflate the price in the situation of unexpected part shortage. A
manufacturer’s trust in its supplier therefore reduced the need
for the manufacturer to monitor the supplier and instead,
delegate the monitoring function to its supplier. The
manufacturer that trusts its supplier is therefore less likely to
perceive the hazard of the supplier’s opportunistic behavior
regardless of the level of environmental volatility, thereby leading
to low level of monitoring exercised. The manufacturer with high
trust in its supplier thus does not increase monitoring over its
supplier, as it’s perceived environmental uncertainty increases.
Therefore: 
H2: When a manufacturer’s perceived trust is high, there is no
relationship between environmental uncertainty and a
manufacturer’s monitoring over the supplier(see figure 1). 
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Environmental Uncertainty, Perceived Supplier Performance, and Trust
As environmental uncertainty increases, the information about
the environment is likely to be asymmetrically distributed
between exchange parties(Klein, Frazier, and Roth 1990). For
instance, a manufacturer experiences uncertainty when the price
of component parts changes rapidly. The manufacturer has
disadvantage compared to its supplier, since the supplier has
more information on the parts than the manufacturer. The
information asymmetry between exchange parties allows the
holder of the information to behave opportunistically(Klein,
Frazier, and Roth 1990) to take advantage of its information
superior position. Therefore, the manufacturer that places a low
level of trust in its supplier is likely to be concerned about the
supplier’s opportunistic behavior as environmental uncertainty
increases, which negatively influences the manufacturer’s
perception of the supplier’s performance. 
When trust in its supplier is low, the manufacturer in an
uncertain environment spends a substantial amount of time and
resources to monitor the product quality of the supplier, since
the manufacturer does not count on its supplier for credible
performance. There are costs involved with the possession and
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inspection of products and with the processing of performance
data(Stump and Heide 1996; Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990).
Delay in delivery and an inaccurate delivery may call for the
manufacturer’s efforts to put pressure on suppliers to ensure
accurate delivery(Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990). Similar
efforts are required when product quality is lower than expected.
Thus, these transaction costs for manufacturer with low trust in
its supplier would negatively influence the manufacturer’s
perception of supplier’s performance. Thus, the third hypothesis
is: 
H3: When a manufacturer’s trust in its supplier is low, as the
manufacturer’s perception of environmental uncertainty
increases, the manufacturer’s satisfaction with the supplier
performance decreases.
When manufacturer’s trust in its supplier is high, a
manufacturer believes that its supplier will deliver the product
on time and with an expected quality and price in uncertain
environments. Thus, a manufacturer that trusts in its supplier is
less likely to feel the need to spend resource for monitoring or
enforcement of the supplier to obtain component parts that show
volatile supply. Thus, trust allows the manufacturer to maintain
transaction costs at a low level in high environmental
uncertainty, which leads to higher satisfaction with supplier
performance.
An exchange party with trust in its partner is willing to share
information(Lewis and Weight 1985; Zand 1972). Thus, a
manufacturer that trusts its supplier in stable(low uncertainty)
environments can provide the information on its expected
demand for the component parts. This information can provide
assistance to the supplier by manipulating the inventory in
advance. The greater information exchange between the
manufacturer and the supplier in stable environments therefore
boosts the supplier’s performance. In sum, information exchange
and low monitoring costs under high trust leads to satisfaction
with the supplier’s performance regardless of the level of
environmental uncertainty. The fourth hypothesis is therefore: 
H4: When manufacturer’s trust in its supplier is high, there is
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no relationship between a manufacturer’s perceived
environmental uncertainty and its satisfaction with the supplier
performance(see figure 2).
METHODOLOGY
Research Setting and Data Collection
The context chosen for this study is the relationship between a
manufacturer and its major supplier in the USA. The major
supplier is the one from which the informant’s company made
the largest amount of purchases during the past year. This major
supplier served as the referent for all questions in our mail
survey. The above setting is selected because the major supplier
is the one with whom the manufacturer is likely to have the most
intense interactions and the opportunity to exercise monitoring. 
Sample and Respondents
The manufacturers in this study were selected randomly from
a Dun and Bradstreet mailing list: SIC codes from 3679
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(electronic), 2399(textile), 3469(metal), and 3499(steel),
representing manufacturing companies. Half of the
manufacturers were chosen from the electric and electronic
industries and the rest of the companies belonged to industries
such as leather and rubber products. This way, I expected to
eliminate industry specific influences on governance structure.
As this research is about buyers’ governance structure, we
chose as key informants the heads of purchasing departments of
the manufacturing companies. Purchasing managers are
responsible for securing materials from suppliers, hence they can
be expected to be knowledgeable about the materials bought and
to have a close relationship with suppliers(Hutt and Speh 2000). 
To assess whether the key informants in this study had
relevant knowledge, a pre-test was conducted. Pre-test
respondents were asked whether they felt competent enough to
respond to the survey questions(e.g., Kumar, Stern, and Achrol
1992). The pre-test results indicated that the respondent
companies had an average of 18 years of relationship with their
major suppliers. The average length of time each informant had
occupied his or her current position was 5.8 years. Furthermore,
our respondents appeared very knowledgeable about their
supplier’s products(mean knowledge level was 5.9 out of 7 where
one meant “I do not have any knowledge”, and seven meant “I do
have great deal of knowledge”). This compares very well with the
ratings that Kumar, Stern, and Achrol(1992) reported on similar
items. 
Procedure
Each purchasing manager in our sample was mailed 1) a
questionnaire, and 2) a cover letter with a request to complete
the enclosed questionnaire, as well as 3) a postage paid return
envelope. Two weeks after the first mailing, a second mailing was
conducted. 
A total of 680 questionnaires were mailed, and 21
questionnaires were undelivered. 176 were completed and
returned for a response rate of 26.70%. All returned
questionnaires were reviewed for completeness. Two
questionnaires with numerous missing answers were dropped
from the sample. The remaining 174 questionnaires were used in
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our analysis.
Nonresponse Bias
The test for nonresponse bias was conducted by comparing
early respondents with late respondents(Armstrong and Overton
1977). The respondents were divided into two equal groups
based on the date of response(i.e., early respondents, late
respondents). The mean values for each scale and characteristics
of company and key informants(i.e., years of relationship with
the supplier, years of experience as a purchasing manager in the
company, trust, environmental volatility) were compared across
the two groups. The results of this comparison indicated no
significant differences between two groups on those scales and
characteristics, suggesting that the data are not skewed by non-
response bias(The p-values for these comparisons ranged from
.25 to .65). 
Corporate Affiliations Plus(2004) was used for gathering
secondary data on company’s characteristics for both responding
and nonresponding firms. Comparisons across the numbers of
employees and total sales also produced no significant
differences(p< .72 for employees, and p< .50 for sales volume).
Finally response rates across industry groups(electronics, metal,
textile, and steel) were examined, and found that they did not
differ.
Measure Development
Measure development was carried out in two stages. In the first
stage, existing measures for our constructs were gathered from
the literature while in the second stage, depth interviews were
conducted with three purchasing managers to check the
relevance of the items developed in the first stage. The wording of
some of the items was revised based on the inputs from the
interviewed purchasing managers. All items used a 7-point Likert
scale where 1 meant “strongly disagree” and 7 meant “strongly
agree”. 
The first part of the development process had to do with the
dimensions of trust being assessed with the items adapted from
Doney and Cannon(1997). The scale addresses a supplier’s
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Table 1. Construct Measurement Summary
Reliability
Environmental Uncertainty .73
Availability of major product in the market is 
highly uncertain. .74
Volatility in the production of major product is a real 
problem in the market. .79
The supply of major product is not stable. .52
Price for major product in the market is volatile. *
Trust .95
When making important decisions, the supplier is 
concerned about our welfare. .91
When it comes to things that are important to us, 
our firm can depend on the supplier’s support. .85
Our firm can count on the supplier to consider how 
its decisions and actions will affect us. .81
Our firm can count on the supplier to be sincere. .73
Monitoring .85
Our firm regularly conducts performance review 
of the supplier. .80
Our firm monitors the supplier’s inventory level. .77
Our firm monitors the supplier’s product quality regularly .85
The relationship our firm has with the supplier 
makes use of many controls. .70
Our firm regularly monitors the price of parts 
supplied by the supplier. .72
Supplier Performance .75
Our firm is satisfied with the Supplier’s product quality. .79
The service provided by the Supplier is satisfactory. .56
Our firm is satisfied with the overall supplying 
of the Supplier. .37
Our firm is satisfied with the on-time delivery 
performance of the Supplier. .52
Fit statistics: χ2 = 157.99 df = 98 (p=.001), GFI =.91 CFI = .94, IFI = .94,
RMSEA = .066
trustworthy behavior such as keeping its own promises as well
as a supplier’s concerns about business success of the
manufacturer. The scale for monitoring assesses manufacturer’s
monitoring over various supplier decisions(Noordewier, John,
and Nevin 1990). The scale of environmental uncertainty mainly
captured the manufacturer’s perception of various aspects of the
supplied product(Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990). Supplier’s
Performance measures manufacturer’s evaluation of its supplier’s
product quality, services, and speed of delivery(Doney and
Cannon 1997). 
Construct validity 
Each variable that was measured with multiple items was
subjected to a scale development and purification procedure. On
the basis of item-total correlations, ill-fitting items were dropped.
The subsequent reduced sets of items were subjected to
confirmatory factor analysis using LISREL 8.3. Then reliability
analyses were run for each construct to see if all the measures
demonstrate satisfactory coefficient reliability. 
First, convergent validity was tested. Based on the results, one
of the items with low loading with intended factors was removed
from the scales. Among the items for environmental uncertainty,
volatility in price(UNCER4) was deleted due to higher cross
loading to the latent variable of supplier performance. After
deleting this item, an acceptable fit of factor model for the four
latent variables, trust(TRUST), environmental uncertainty
(UNCERT), supplier performance(PERFORM), and monitoring
(MONITOR), adequately fit the data(χ2 = 157.99 df = 98(p <.01),
GFI =.91 CFI = .94, IFI = .94 RMSEA = . 066). All the factor
loadings were highly significant(p <.01), which shows
unidimsionality of the measures(Anderson and Gerbing 1988).
Further, reliability tests were done for each construct to see if all
the measures demonstrate satisfactory coefficient reliability. All
the reliabilities of the constructs were above .70(between 0.73
and 0.95). Thus, these measures demonstrate adequate
convergent validity and reliability. 
Discriminant validity of all 4 latent constructs through χ2
difference tests. All the constructs in pairs(6 tests altogether)
were tested if the restricted model(in which the correlation was
The Influence of Interfirm Trust on Monitoring and Performance ~ 15
fixed as one) was significantly worse than the freely estimated
model(in which the correlated was estimated freely). All the χ2
differences were highly significant, which shows the evidence for
discriminant validity (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). For example,
the comparison regarding environmental uncertainty and trust
yielded a χ2(1) = 25.65(p < .01), suggesting these two constructs
are distinct. Taken together, these results show that the
measures in this study possess adequate reliability and validity
(Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). The results of CFA such as
goodness-of-fit index, factor loading, reliability are reported in
table 1.
Control Variables: industry, firm size, and power asymmetry
were used as control variables. Industry was coded as a dummy
variable: electronic and electric industries = 1, other industries =
0. Firm size was indicated by the logarithm of the number of
employees. Third, manufacturer’s power over supplier was
assessed by supplier replaceability, supplier switching costs,
difficulty in changing supplier, and overall dependence on
supplier(Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989, Kumar, Scheer, and
Steenkamp 1995, and Lusch and Brown 1996). The rationale
behind including testing models with manufacturer’s power over
supplier is that the power allows a manufacturer to potentially
control its supplier(Frazier and Antia 1995; Gaski 1984). The
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Table 2. Correlation Matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Environmental Uncertainty 1.000
2. Trust -.134 1.000
3. Monitoring .196 .105 1.000
4. Performance -.323 .707 -.103 1.000
5. Power Asymmetry .045 -.154 .192 .011 1.000
6. Relationship Length .023 .104 .033 .072 .058 1.000
7. Industry .014 -.054 .007 .062 -.027 .092 1.000
Mean 3.153 5.052 3.362 5.794 -1.04 15 0.51
Standard Deviation .225 .028 .152 .044 1.22 13.23 0.50
Number of Items 3 4 5 4 6 1 1
Note: sample size = 174
correlation matrix of all the variables in the test model is
presented in table 2.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Tests of Hypotheses
A linear model for two dependent variables(monitoring,
supplier performance) was estimated. Partition each condition of
trust and environmental uncertainty into high(above 66%),
middle(33% - 66%), and low(below 33%) groups using 3 group
splits. Since the average value of trust is relatively high(average =
5.02) and the average value of environmental uncertainty is
relatively low(average = 3.15), high trust(average = 6.05) and low
trust(average = 3.87) groups and two groups for high(average =
4.78) and low(average = 2.25) environmental uncertainties were
used to form the dummy variables. To eliminate potential
problems associated with multicollinearity, a statistical test with
mean-centered variables was done with variance inflation factors
(VIF) outcomes(Aiken and West 1991). The statistical output
shows that VIFs were well below the cutoff value of 10,
suggesting that multicollinearity is not present.
(1) MONITOR = b0 + b1D1 + b2D2 + b3D4 + b4 LENGTH + b5
INDUSTRY + b6 INTASY
The dummy variables D1, D2, and D4 represent the
combinations of values of uncertainty and trust magnitude
corresponding to cells 1(C1), 2(C2), and 4(C4) respectively (see
Table 3). The critical theoretical predictions, stated in terms of
cells’ control differences (D1 - D2) and (D3 - D4), are tested in
the following manner. The estimated coefficient corresponding to
each effect is first pinpointed. 
The control difference between cell 4 and cell 3 (D4 - D3) is
provided by the coefficient of D4 (b4 = -3.886, t = -2.288, p < .05)
which reflects the deduction of Cell 4 from Cell 3 regarding the
level of control, since D3 is not included in the regression model
(Aiken and West 1991). The result shows that the manufacturer’s
perception of increasing environmental uncertainty under low
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trust raises the manufacturer’s reliance on monitoring over the
supplier, thereby supporting hypothesis 1. 
Regarding the (C2 - C1) effect that is estimated by b1 - b2,
Table 3 shows estimate size of this effect as .657, which is
calculated from coefficient estimates (b1 - b2 = 4.327 - 3.670 =
.657). The effect is not different from that produced by zero. To
get specific statistical output for the difference between D1 and
D2, another multiple regressions was run without D1 and
including D2, D3, D4, and control variables(Aiken and West
1991). b1 this model reflects the difference between D1 and D2,
since D1 is not included in the regression model (b1 = .657, t =
.441, p = .660). These results support hypothesis 2 and indicate
that the pattern of effects consists of two nonparallel lines, as
was shown in figure 2. This result shows that the perception of
increasing environmental uncertainty under high trust does not
increase manufacturer’s monitoring over the supplier. 
(2) PERFORM = b0 + b1D1 + b2D2 + b3D4 + b4 LENGTH + b5
INDUSTRY + b6 INTASY
The dummy variables D1, D2, and D4 represent the
combinations of values of uncertainty and trust corresponding to
cells 1(P1), 2(P2), and 4 (P4) respectively. The critical theoretical
predictions, stated in terms of cell differences of the extent of
perceived performance (D2 - D1) and (D4 - D3), are tested. The
effect of D4 - D3, the deduction of Cell 3 from Cell 4 regarding
the level of the perceived performance, is provided by the b3 in
Table 3 (1.740; t = 2.325, p < .01), thereby supporting hypothesis
3. 
With regard to the D2 - D1 effect, the difference between cell 2
and cell 1, was assessed by b2 - b1. The effect is calculated from
coefficient estimates (b2 - b1 = 2.492 - 2.243 = .249), which is not
different from zero. More specific statistical output for the effect
was derived by another multiple regression without D4 and
including D2, D3, and D4 as predictors. b1 coefficient in this
model reflects the difference between D2 and D1 (b1 = .249, t =
.386, p = .700). These results support hypothesis 4, and indicate
that the pattern of effects consists of two nonparallel lines, as
shown in figure 3. These results show that manufacturer’s
perception of increasing environmental uncertainty under high
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trust does not decrease manufacturer’s perceived supplier
performance.
The Effects of Control Variables: Power asymmetry has positive
impacts on manufacturer’s adoption of monitoring over the
supplier. It appears that manufacturer that has asymmetrical
power advantage over its supplier tends to rely on monitoring
over the supplier(see table 3).
DISCUSSION
Theoretical Implications
This study shows that interfirm trust is a critical factor for
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manufacturers that should decide on a relevant level of
monitoring in uncertain environments. Manufacturers in an
environmental uncertainty would have to maintain a high level of
monitoring over the supplier when they do not trust their
exchange partners. However, those with a high level of trust in
its supplier may rely less on monitoring over the exchange
partner. The manufacturer can therefore adapt to an uncertain
environment without resorting to a high level of monitoring when
it trust its supplier. In contrast, supplier performance, as
perceived by manufacturers, is negatively associated with
environmental uncertainty when a manufacturer’s trust in its
supplier is low, but it has no relationship with environmental
uncertainty where the manufacturer trusts the supplier. 
Transaction cost analysis(TCA) acknowledges that exchange
parties often act on the basis of trust, but the difficulty in
identifying trustworthy partners was so great that parties had to
structure themselves as if all exchange partners could not be
trusted(Williamson 1991). Thus, TCA framework does not
include trust as a critical factor that influences inter-
organizational governance structure. Instead, TCA proposes that
exchange parties tend to behave opportunistically if they are
given the chance. Although all parties may not be opportunistic,
it is again costly to sort out those who are opportunistic from
those who are not(Williamson and Ouchi 1981). Since the
transaction costs in market exchange to prevent such
opportunism is so high, TCA suggested interfirm control
structures, such as vertical integration or interfirm control. 
However, a recent view of TCA relaxed the assumption of
opportunism, thereby allowing the existence of trust in the
interfirm relationship(e.g. Atuahene-Gima and Li 2002; Wathne
and Heide 2000; Williamson 1991). The TCA model acknowledges
that opportunistic behavior can take place under any
circumstances, but certain vulnerable conditions facilitate
opportunism: information asymmetry(Atuahene-Gima and Li
2002; Wathne and Heide 2000). Information asymmetry
regarding a party’s actions limits one party’s ability to detect
opportunism. Wathne and Heide(2000) therefore do not treat
opportunism as a constant level, and varies depending on
situation. Nooteboom(1996) thus argues that it is unreasonable
to ignore the formation of perceptions about the propensity
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towards opportunism, and the possibility of building trust.
This study shows that the introduction of trust in the TCA
model could shift the comparative cost and performance of
interfirm governance, which eventually alters the choice of
governance structures between hierarchical(vertical integration
or high interfirm control) and market(or low interfirm control)
governances. Market governance relying on trust incurs relatively
low transaction costs than does hierarchical governance. Thus,
exchange parties that should exercise a high level of interfirm
control according to TCA prediction might choose market
governance when they consider their trust in their suppliers.
Therefore, the inclusion of trust in the TCA model will enhance
the predictive power of TCA. 
The result of this study is consistent with the other empirical
study that attempts to integrate the economic approach of TCA
with behavioral approach. Heide & John(1992) showed that
relational norms between exchange parties allow a buyer to gain
control over its supplier. Since relational norms are the way
exchange parties should behave for mutual benefits(Heide &
John 1992), relational norms are an influencing force on the
parties’ behavior. Thus, relational norms contribute to increased
control over the partner. In contrast, trust is an exchange party’s
unilateral belief that its partner will behave in the party’s
interest, which actually does not influence the partner’s behavior
much. As the definition of trust itself shows, trust is a
willingness to rely upon the supplier whose behavior is not under
its control. Trust therefore has a feature of vulnerability that
comes from the absence of control over the exchange partner.
Thus, trust is not relevant for gaining control over the exchange
partner, but it is a mechanism through which exchange parties
reduce control and improve transaction performance.
This study shows that power asymmetry is another factor for
influencing the level of monitoring over the exchange partner.
This is consistent with the prediction of bilateral deterrence
theory which argues that the more asymmetrical power is, the
more likely the party with greater power would be to use its
relative power(Lawler and Bacharach 1987). This is so because
the more powerful party in an asymmetrical relationship can
more easily obtain the other’s compliance(Kumar, Scheer, and
Steenkamp 1995), and the less powerful party has a lower ability
The Influence of Interfirm Trust on Monitoring and Performance ~ 21
to deter its partner from exercising its own power(Lawler and
Bacharach 1987). Therefore, manufacturer that has
asymmetrical power advantage over its supplier is likely to
depend on monitoring.
Managerial Implications
When manufacturers face volatile price changes for component
parts, or uncertain parts supply, a high level of monitoring is not
always the best option they can depend on. Since monitoring
supplier’s inventory or checking product quality incurs costs,
manufacturers should find a way to reduce monitoring. Since a
manufacturer can estimate how much it can trust its supplier
(Madhavan & Grover 1998; Doney and Cannon 1997), it can
reduce control over the supplier when the estimated trust on its
supplier is high. The manufacturer can therefore reduce
transaction costs, thereby increasing the efficiency of buying
performance. Trust is therefore a valuable economic asset that
exchange parties can rely on when they face uncertain
environments. The manufacturer should consider the level of
trust(high or low) in their suppliers and decide on the level of
monitoring over the suppliers.
An exchange relationship characterized by a high level of
monitoring could not flexibly respond to changing environments
(Andaleeb 1995). Since a manufacturer unilaterally influences its
supplier’s inventory level through vendor evaluation programs,
there might not be much room for the supplier to make its own
decision. Thus, when a manufacturer with high level of
monitoring over its supplier has to change an order for
components, the supplier would be very reluctant to respond to
the request due to the lack of autonomy. In contrast, a supplier
with a low level of monitoring would flexibly respond to the
request for the change of an order, because the inventory control
is mainly the supplier’s responsibility. Therefore, manufacturers
should find a way to develop trust in the relationship with its
supplier. 
Limitations & Future Study
This study uses perceptual performance measure like most
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interfirm studies(e.g., Jap 1999; Kumar, Stern, and Achrol
1992), and does not measure factual performance data(e.g.,
Noordewier John & Nevin 1992; Buchanan 1992). It seems that
factual data such as percentage of late delivery or the ratio of
defected products is a direct way to measure supplying
performance. However, respondents are reluctant to reveal
factual data to researchers(Siguaw, Simpson, Baker 1998). Thus,
the ideal way to measure channel performance is to measure
both perceptual and factual performance data to increase the
reliability. The future study should assess both performance
measures.
Future research may be directed towards the investigation of
the influence of trust on the firm’s control over its exchange
partner when it has transaction specific asset(TSI). TSI is a
specific investment that is specialized to a particular exchange
relationship, so it cannot be used for other relationships
(Williamson 1991). TSI therefore creates a hostage situation in
which a partner exploits the TSI holder through opportunistic
behavior. TSI thus could lead to lower level of satisfaction due to
the opportunistic behavior that tries to exploit the TSI holders.
Thus, according to TCA, TSI is another key factor that forces the
investing firm to control its partner as a safeguard. It would be
interesting to study whether or not trust could work as a
mechanism for reducing control against TSI. 
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